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Returns  to  Migration,  Education,  and  Externalities  in  the  European 
Union 
Abstract 
Relatively  little attention has  been paid to the role  that  externalities  play  in  determining  the 
pecuniary returns to migration. This paper addresses this gap, using microeconomic data for more 
than 100,000 individuals living in the European Union (EU) for the period 1994-2001 in order to 
analyse whether the individual economic returns to education vary between migrants and non-
migrants  and  whether  any  observed  differences  in  earnings  between  migrants  and  locals  are 
affected by household and/or geographical (regional and interregional) externalities. The results 
point  out  that  while  education  is  a  fundamental  determinant  of  earnings.,  European  labour 
markets – contrary to expectations – do not discriminate in the returns to education between 
migrants  and  non-migrants.  The  paper  also  finds  that  household,  regional,  and  interregional 
externalities influence the economic returns to education, but that they do so in a similar way for 
local, intranational, and supra-national migrants. The results are robust to the introduction of a 
large number of individual, household, and regional controls. 
   
Keywords:  Individual  earnings,  migration,  educational  attainment,  externalities,  household, 
regions, Europe   3 
1. Introduction 
The  economic  and  pecuniary  returns  to  migration  have  been  studied  extensively  in 
labour,  household,  and  regional  economics.  In  particular,  numerous  empirical  studies 
have  examined  the  determinants  of  migrants’  wages  in  comparison  to  that  of  non-
migrants (Borjas et al. 1992, Lanzona 1998, Card 2007, Ottaviano and Peri 2008). The 
majority of the microeconomic studies focusing on the economic returns to migration 
have  concentrated  on  the  role  of  the  individual  and  household  characteristics  of  the 
migrant. Individual differences in education, gender, employment and other observable 
characteristics have been thoroughly scrutinized and tend to be relevant in determining 
the earnings of both migrants and non-migrants, although the size and dimension of the 
relationship is often contested.  
However, other factors have tended to be overlooked by the literature. This is the case of 
geographical factors. Yet geography or place-based endowments and conditions can play 
an important role in determining a migrant’s earning potential. Some territories may be 
more welcoming and may allow migrants to make the transition to jobs that are more 
suited to their skills earlier and faster than others, thus maximizing the economic returns 
of  the  migrant.  Conversely,  other  environments  may  be  more  migrant  averse  and 
newcomers may find themselves stuck in jobs well below their potential and existing 
skills for longer. This paper represents an attempt to cover this gap in the literature by 
analysing  whether  and  how  place-based  externalities  (regional  and  interregional 
externalities) matter in determining the pecuniary returns to migration. 
Using data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) survey covering the 
period 1994-2001, the paper addresses how geographical externalities affect the earnings 
of migrants in the regions of the European Union (EU). The aim is to determine, first, 
whether the individual pecuniary returns to schooling vary – after controlling for a series 
of  individual  background  variables,  such  as  occupational  and  employment  status  and 
health – between migrants and locals and between the two migrant groups considered: 
intranational and international migrants. Second, we aim to establish whether household 
and  geographical  wage  and  education  externalities  affect  the  individual  earnings  of 
migrants and locals in different ways, taking into account that other factors such as the   4 
number  of  years  a  migrant  has  been  living  in  any  particular  region  or  the  level  of 
development  of  the  country  of  origin  may  also  influence  the  earning  potential  of 
migrants. 
We use a traditional  Mincerian specification (Mincer 1974), to which a regional  and 
interregional dimension is added, in order to capture wage and educational externalities 
not  only  within  regions  (regional  externalities),  but  also  across  regions  (interregional 
externalities). This allows us to examine whether any differences in individual earnings 
between migrants and non-migrants across regions in the EU are the result of (a) the 
educational attainment of the individual, (b) the educational attainment and wage of the 
other  members  of  the  household  s/he  lives  in  (household  externalities),  (c)  the 
educational endowment and wage level of the region where the individual lives (regional 
externalities), and (d) the educational endowment and wage level of the neighbouring 
regions (interregional externalities). 
In order to achieve this aim, the paper is structured in the following  way:  Section 2 
reviews  the  relationship  between  returns  to  migration  and  externalities;  Section  3 
provides the econometric specification for the empirical analysis, discusses the data, and 
presents the descriptive analysis of the variables of our model; Section 4 displays and 
analyses the empirical econometric results and; Section 5 concludes. 
2. Theoretical considerations: migration and externalities 
2.1 Migration and individual characteristics: the role of individual returns to schooling 
Since the work of Schultz (1961) and Becker (1962), education has been regarded as the 
main  factor  explaining  differences  in  earnings  among  individuals.  Education  can  be 
considered as an investment of current resources in exchange for future returns. Hence, 
the  higher  the  level  of education  of an  individual,  the  higher  the  expected economic 
returns,  as education  enhances  an  individual’s  innate skills,  increases  both  his  or her 
social and job opportunities and his or her productivity (Wolf 2002) and acts as a ‘label’ 
or ‘signal’ in the labour market (Spence 1973). 
In  principle,  the  individual  pecuniary  returns  to  education  should  be  independent  of 
whether  the  individual  is  a  local  or  a  migrant.  Individuals  with  similar  levels  of   5 
qualifications working in similar jobs should expect to earn a similar wage regardless of 
the region or country of origin. There are, however, a series of factors that may alter the 
relationship between education and earnings for migrants. Some of these factors may be 
positive for the migrants, others can be considered as negative. 
On the positive side, the mere fact of migrating tends to single out individuals from the 
rest. Individuals who decide to migrate for economic reasons possess on average a higher 
level  of  innate  ability  than  locals  (Chiswick  1978)  and  also  tend  to  be  much  more 
receptive  to  economic  incentives  than  the  rest  of  the  population  (Lanzona  1998, 
Nakosteen et al. 2008). Economic migrants leave their place of origin in order to try to 
maximize the value of their lifetime utility (Sjaastad 1962). Hence, economic migrants, 
for the sheer reason that their aim is to increase their lifetime earnings and gain better 
employment opportunities, can be considered as more dynamic and entrepreneurial than 
the average person in the territory of origin (Sjaastad 1962, Böheim and Taylor 2007, 
Nakosteen et al. 2008). Potential migrants are also more prone to weigh their expected 
income or career benefits against the financial  and psychological costs – such as the 
psychological adjustments that have to be made when changing one’s home and work 
environment – of moving to a certain region or country than non movers. This implies 
that they are also likely to move to those areas yielding the highest potential individual 
economic returns (Zhao 1999, Pekkala 2002). Migrants are also more likely to factor in 
any potential short-term initial loss in earnings linked to migration, as they would expect 
any decline in earnings to be followed in the medium- and long-run by eventual gains 
that depend on the success of their assimilation into the new environment and labour 
market (Borjas et al. 1992). Borjas et al. (1992), for instance, show that internal migrants 
in the US initially earn less than natives, but this wage differential disappears within a 
few years. From this perspective, migrants will have personal traits that may result, after 
an initial settling in period, in higher earnings than locals, at similar levels of education. 
Other factors will, in contrast, undermine the earnings’ potential of migrants. Lack of 
complete  information  –  or  the  presence  of  biased  information  –  about  the  place  of 
destination  and  its  labour  market,  about  its  norms  and  habits,  or  lack  or  deficient 
knowledge  of  the  language  are  powerful  barriers  that  limit  the  potential  returns  to   6 
education for migrants (Borjas et al. 1992). Legal barriers, such as problems or delays in 
the recognition of degrees, also represent a serious impediment for the fulfilment of the 
earnings potential of a migrant, as does the valuation of the migrant’s skills in the place 
of  destination.  The  combination  of  these  factors  may  result  in  a  lower  level  of 
employment  for  migrants  –  and  especially  for  the  partners  of initial  migrants –  after 
family  reunification  (Nivalainen,  2005).  The  geographical  origin  of  migrants  also 
determines the incidence of these negative forces. International migrants tend to be much 
more  affected  by  imperfect  knowledge  of  the  local  labour  market  and  the  general 
environment at the place of destination than intranational migrants. They will also be 
more disadvantaged as a group by legal obstacles and by a lack or imperfect knowledge 
of the language.  
When both positive and negative factors are put in a balance, it is unclear whether the 
positive influences related to the greater entrepreneurship and dynamism of the average 
migrant outweigh the potential negative factors linked to a lack of adequate information 
and knowledge about the place of destination, and to legal and other types of barriers. 
2.2  Migration  and  household  characteristics:  the  role  of  wage  and  education 
household externalities 
The earnings of any individual are, however, not only affected by his or her level of 
education, but also by a number of externalities. Within the household, these externalities 
include the level of education and the wages of the other members of the household. 
Interactions among household members create benefits that may be translated into higher 
earnings for individual members of the household. Positive household externalities (i.e. 
high level of education and wage of the other members of the household) may lead to 
higher  wages  for  members  of  that  household  than  for  similarly  educated  individuals 
living  outside  that  household  or  in  households  with  negative  educational  and  wage 
externalities (Basu et al. 2001, Lindelow 2008). This makes household background a 
powerful determinant of earnings. 
Household externalities, in principle, are likely to affect locals and migrants in a similar 
way. There are, however, certain characteristics specific to migrant households that may 
affect  the  earning  potential  of  individuals.  First,  decisions  to  migrate  are  not  only   7 
determined by the characteristics of any given individual, but also by the characteristics 
of  the  other  members  of  the  household  where  the  individual  lives.  This,  in  turn, 
influences total household wage (Axelsson and Westerlund 1998). 
One clear way through which this influence is exerted is by the fact that many migrants 
are what is known as ‘tied’ movers (Mincer 1978), that is individuals whose decision to 
migrate is determined by that of a partner, spouse, or another member of the household. 
The net gains of ‘tied’ movers are thus likely to be dominated by the gains (or losses) of 
their  partner  or  spouse,  making  it  more  likely  that  certain  members  of  a  migrant 
household are, at least initially, likely to have lower earnings than similarly qualified 
members of local households. This means that the wages of ‘tied’ movers are less likely 
to increase and may, in most cases, be expected to fall at least in the short-run relative to 
their pre-migration wages (Böheim and Taylor 2007: 100). ‘Tied’ migration frequently 
reproduces and reinforces gender divisions, as women are more likely to be ‘tied’ movers 
than men (Nivalainen 2004). Cooke (2003: 340), for example, states that “wives sacrifice 
their own careers in order to support their husbands’ careers by following them as tied 
migrants,  largely  independent  of  their  own  relative  economic  power,  socioeconomic 
status, or education level”. This normally results in a gender division of the household 
returns, with men’s earnings generally positively influenced by migration, while changes 
in women’s earnings generally dissociated from migration (Nilsson 2001). However, this 
is far from a universal view, as some scholars argue that women tend to be, at least in 
certain geographical contexts, more migratory than men (Détang-Dessendre and Molho 
2000, Faggian et al. 2007b). 
Once again, negative household externalities are more likely to affect international than 
intranational migrants. While ‘tied’ intranational movers will be more familiar with the 
new environment, have their skills and degrees recognised, and be in command in the 
local language, international ‘tied’ movers will tend to remain out of the labour force for 
longer and, once in the labour market, will take longer to get to jobs that match their level 
of skills. 
2.3.  Migration  and  (inter)regional  characteristics:  the  role  of  wage  and  education 
(inter)regional externalities   8 
Finally,  the  earnings  potential  of  any  individual  depends  not  only  on  his/her  own 
investments in education and the investments of the other members of his/her household, 
but also on a series of place-based (regional and interregional) conditions. The income of 
equally  educated  individuals  varies  significantly  from  one  region  to  another. 
(Inter)regional wage and education spillovers are particularly interesting because of the 
prominent  role  they  play  in  theories  of  economic  development.  The  average  human 
capital of workers in any given region is likely to increase productivity across the board. 
This  increase  in  productivity  will  expand  beyond  regional  borders.  Knowledge,  for 
instance, will leak from one worker to another and from one region to another (Easterly 
2001, Tselios 2008).  
More  specifically,  educational  externalities,  on  the  one  hand,  promote  sharing  of 
knowledge and encourage the exchange of ideas, imitation, and learning-by-doing, thus 
raising productivity (Acemoglu and Angrist 2001: 14). Pecuniary externalities, on the 
other, induce similar effects on productivity through prices. There are also strong links 
between  education  and  pecuniary  externalities:  human  capital  endowment  encourages 
more investment by firms and raises other workers’ wages (Acemoglu and Angrist 2001: 
15). Overall, the higher the educational endowment and the economic development of a 
region, the higher the probability that an individual will increase his/her productivity by 
interacting with others within the region. If wage and education spillovers are present 
through  educational  and  pecuniary  externalities,  the  individual  in  the  rich  and  high 
educational  endowment  region  will  be  more  productive  than  a  similarly  qualified 
individual in a region with a poor educational endowment (Rudd 2000). 
Moreover, complementarity effects matter for regional wage and education spillovers. 
Concentrations of poor and educationally disadvantaged groups within a region tend to 
lower the performance of all, while concentrations of rich and educationally advantaged 
groups have the opposite effects. For instance, the most educated workers may benefit 
more from knowledge spillovers, but the opposite occurs if the least educated workers 
have  a  higher  learning  capability  (Di  Addario  and  Patacchini  2008).  In  addition,  if 
knowledge and skills have a big economic payoff, people will respond to this incentive 
by accumulating knowledge (Easterly 2001, Tselios 2008). Not only are the returns to   9 
education inversely related to the number of people who get educated (Wolf 2002), but 
there is also a greater incentive to get educated in regions with a higher average level of 
education (Tselios 2008). Moreover, the high human capital endowment and economic 
development of a region is a crucial factor facilitating the adoption of new and more 
productive technologies which increase the earnings of those living in the region. 
There is however limited empirical evidence of the impact of regional endowments on 
individual earnings. Most analyses on the topic have been estimated using Mincerian 
wage equations, complemented with a limited number of regional controls, such as  the 
average  regional  wage  and/or  average  human  capital  attainment  (i.e.  Rauch  1993, 
Acemoglu and Angrist 2001, Ciccone and Peri 2006). The results of these analyses are 
far from conclusive. Whereas Rauch (1993) finds that there are productivity gains from 
geographic  concentration  when  estimating  average-schooling  externalities  in  a  cross-
section of U.S. cities in 1980, Ciccone and Peri (2006) report no evidence of significant 
average-schooling externalities in U.S. cities and states between 1970 and 1990. 
The  incidence  of  interregional  educational  externalities  has,  however,  been  mostly 
overlooked by the literature. The few studies that tangentially address it (Tselios 2008, 
Rodríguez-Pose and Tselios 2009) tend to find that interregional externalities contribute 
significantly  to  regional  economic  development.  Nevertheless, this literature  does not 
control for the externalities that may arise from individual educational and knowledge-
based relationships across regional boundaries. However, non-monetary and monetary 
flows are not only stronger among regions that are geographically close to one another, 
but also more effective between homogeneous regions. As López-Bazo et al. (2004: 45) 
argue, neighbouring regions may share markets for labour and goods, and have similar 
capital or managerial talent at their disposal. If this is the case, externalities can result in 
the concentration of firms in macro-areas spanning several regions, thereby transferring 
externalities to the aggregate regional level. In addition, the diffusion of technology is 
often stronger between regions with the same socioeconomic characteristics (Bräuninger 
and  Niebuhr  2005).  Overall,  location  and  proximity  clearly  matter  in  exploiting 
individual  wages  and  therefore  the  omission  of  interregional  characteristics  in  most   10
Mincerian analysis of the economic returns to education is likely to have resulted in a 
misleading picture of the sources of earnings of workers. 
Do geographical externalities make a difference for migrants with respect to the rest of 
the population? One of the main causes of migration, and specifically of international 
migration,  is  the existence of  wage  differentials  between  areas  (Cooper  1994).  Wage 
differentials  among  regions  create  powerful  signals  to  migrants  to  move  (Krieg  and 
Bohara  1999).  And  this  type  of  incentive  to  migrate  will  occur  provided  that  the 
perceived  benefits  exceed  the  costs  both  at  an  individual  (‘people-based’  costs  and 
benefits), but also at a territorial level (‘place-based’ costs and benefits). Differences in 
regional  unemployment  levels  may  play  a  similar  role  to  that  of  wage  differentials 
(Haapanen and Ritsila 2007). 
Geographical externalities may also have more detrimental effects on migrants than on 
locals. As indicated earlier, lack of or inadequate knowledge of the local environment 
may act as a powerful barrier to insertion in the labour market and to achieving adequate 
pecuniary returns to education. Formal and, in most cases, more subtle and informal ways 
of  discrimination  may  also  operate  in  the  labour  market,  with  immigrants  having  to 
become assimilated or integrated in order to overcome these often invisible barriers to 
fulfilling  their  full  educational  potential  in  the  labour  market.  And  international 
immigrants are more likely to experience these barriers than intranational ones. 
Yet despite the importance of these factors, the studies dealing with these issues from a 
quantitative perspective are few and far between. Although there are some studies which 
examine the link between regional labour market and migration decisions (Ritsilä and 
Ovaskainen  2001,  Faggian  et  al.  2007b),  far  fewer  dwell  on  the  link  between 
(inter)regional labour market and earnings of immigrants. This paper tries to address this 
gap in the literature. 
3. Econometric specification, data and variables 
3.1 Econometric specification 
In  order  to  test  whether  there  are  differences  in  the  economic  returns  to  education 
between different types of migrants and locals across regions in the EU, and whether   11
household and geographical externalities play a role in the presence or absence of such 
differences, we propose a Mincerian specification including not only individual variables, 
but also household-level, regional-level, and supra-regional-level variables as explanatory 
variables,  in  order  to  allow  us  to  examine  the  influence  of  education  and  wage 
externalities on individual earnings. In our Mincerian specification, we include (a) the 
educational attainment of the individual, (b) the educational attainment and the wage of 
the  other  members  of  the  household  where  an  individual  lives,  (c)  the  educational 
endowment  and  the  per  capita  wage  of  the  region  where  s/he  lives,  and  (d)  the 
educational  endowment  and  the  per  capita  wage  of  the  neighbouring  regions.  In  the 
model, individual wages are determined according to the following equation: 
it t i s t st it it
it it it s t s t
st st it it it it
Wz z y x
gender rw W Wreduc
rw reduc hw heduc educ w
e j u g g g g
b b b b b
b b b b b
+ + + + + + +
+ + + + + +
+ + + + + =
] [
exp exp ] log [ ] [
log log log
4 3 2 1
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2
9 8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1
 
where  it w log  is the logarithm wage of individual i at time t;  it educ  is a measure of the 
educational  attainment  of  individual  i  at  time  t;  it heduc   is  the  average  educational 
attainment of the other household members for individual  i at time  t;  it hw log  is the 
logarithm wage of the other household members for individual i at time t;  st reduc  is the 
educational endowment of region  s at time t;  st rw log  is the logarithm of the per capita 
wage  of  region  s  at  time  t;  s t Wreduc ] [   is  the  educational  endowment  of  the 
neighbouring regions  s at time  t; and  s t rw W ] log [  is the logarithm of the per capita 
wage of the neighbouring regions  s at time  t. The specification of the interregional 
education and income interaction is represented by a spatial weight matrix  W . In our 
wage equation, W  is a binary matrix (sxsdimension) with elements equal to 1 in the 
case of the  - k nearest neighbouring regions with  = k 5, 7 and 9, and 0 otherwise.  it exp  
is a labour market experience measure and is included as a quadratic term in order to 
capture a potential concavity of the experience/earnings profile (Mincer 1974, Harmon et 
al. 2003).  it gender  is a dummy variable for gender.    12
Three categories of workers are considered in the model: locals (those who were born and 
live  in  the  region),  intranational  migrants  (those  born  in  other  regions  of  the  same 
country),  and  international  migrants  (those  born  abroad).  To  illustrate  and  test  the 
differences  among  these  groups,  we  resort  to  the  use  of  interaction  terms  such  as 
1 xD educit ,  2 xD educit   and  3 xD educit ,  which  denote  educational  attainment  of  locals, 
intranational migrants and international migrants, respectively. It can be argued that these 
three categories of workers are self-selected (Borjas 1987, Borjas et al. 1992, Dostie and 
Leger 2009). It is also worth noting that the characteristics of migrants and non-migrants 
and those of  intranational and international migrants differ significantly (Greenwood 
1975, Pekkala 2002). We address these issues by  using leverage treatment effects while 
controlling for a large number of observables driving migration. These controls include a 
series of individual, household, regional, and interregional variables aimed at minimising 
selection bias in the model (Ottaviano and Peri 2006). 
As highlighted in the previous section, we expect, following Borjas et al. (1992), that the 
number of years a migrant has lived in any particular region will be relevant for his or her 
earning prospects. Hence the introduction of the variable number of years in region  s 
(years since migration), as a means to capture the influence on earnings of settling in 
periods for migrants. Similarly the level of development – proxied by GDP per capita – 
of the country of origin of international  migrants is also included as it may have  an 
influence on their job and earnings prospects and plays a non-negligible role in the initial 
decision to migrate (Ritsilä and Ovaskainen 2001).
1 
The coefficient  1 b  represents the internal (private) returns to education, the coefficients 
2 b ,  4 b  and  6 b  represent the external returns to education and the coefficients  3 b ,  5 b  
and  7 b  represent the external returns to wages. In particular,  2 b ,  4 b  and  6 b  capture the 
household, regional, and interregional education externalities, respectively; while 3 b ,  5 b  
and  7 b   capture  the  household,  regional,  and  interregional  wage  externalities, 
respectively. A significant coefficient of the average educational attainment of the other 
household  members,  of  the  regional  education  endowment,  or  of  the  educational 
                                                 
1 The level of development of the country of origin can be regarded as a kind of national externality.   13
endowment  of  the  neighbouring  regions  will  in  all  likelihood  signal  the  presence  of 
external effects to education, while a significant coefficient of the average wage of the 
other household members, of the regional per capita wage, or of the per capita wage of 
the neighbouring regions will do the same with wage externalities. It has to be born in 
mind,  however,  that  these  effects  may  not  reflect  ‘true’  educational  and  wage 
externalities. Instead any significant coefficients may be largely the result of household, 
regional,  and  neighbouring  region  characteristics  that  may  be  correlated  with  the 
educational  attainment  at  a  household,  regional,  and  broader  geographical  level, 
respectively (Rudd 2000). In order to minimise this potential risk, we include a vector of 
individual-specific  it x ,  household-  (and  individual-)  specific  it y , regional-specific  st z  
and interregional-specific  s t Wz ] [  characteristics.  1 g ,  2 g ,  3 g  and  4 g  are the coefficients 
of those specific characteristics. By adding this set of control variables, we are able to 
capture  some  relevant  structural  individual,  household,  regional,  and  interregional 
features, while simultaneously dealing with important sources of heterogeneity and, as 
mentioned earlier, addressing part of the problem of selection bias. Finally,  i u  depicts the 
unobserved  time-invariant  characteristics  of  individual  i  (such  as  innate  ability),  t j  
represents time-dummies, and  it e  is the disturbance term. 
In the model a measure of the logarithmic earnings  w for an individual is projected on 
the intrinsic characteristics of the individual, the characteristics of the other members of 
the household he/she lives in, the socioeconomic conditions of his/her region, and the 
broader geographical influences of neighbouring regions. Hence, in our model household 
and geographical externalities are expected to affect earnings. 
The analysis uses fixed effects estimators as they allow us to control for time-invariant 
individual characteristics  i u , which are essential factors in any decision to migrate. 
3.2 Data and variables   14
The data used in this paper fundamentally stem – as in previous papers on related topics  
(i.e. Rodríguez-Pose and Tselios 2009) – from the ECHP dataset.
2 These micro data can 
be aggregated regionally, depending on countries, at NUTS I or II level for the EU. All 
cases with errors and missing values in the variables of educational attainment, work 
experience, and gender, as well as individuals without a wage or a salary were removed 
from the dataset. This left a final panel dataset covering 321,026 individuals living in 80 
regions and 12 European countries for the period 1994-2001. The countries in our study 
include  the  following:  Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Greece,  Ireland, 
Italy,  Portugal,  Spain,  The  Netherlands,  and  the  United  Kingdom.
3  The  ECHP  is, 
however,  not  problem  free.  Some  of  the  limitations  of  the  database  for  this  type  of 
analysis include (a) the fact that as some countries consist of only one region (Denmark, 
Finland,  Ireland,  and  The  Netherlands),  and  (b)  the  level  of  attrition.  Attrition  is 
nevertheless  is  a problem  common  to virtually  all panel surveys  and  existing studies 
show that the level of attrition of analyses based on the ECHP – which is mainly random 
rather than selective attrition (Watson 2003) – has a negligible impact on results (Watson 
2003).   
The variable ‘wage and salary earnings’ from the ECHP is used as the source for the 
individual earnings of workers. We measure real wages instead of nominal ones in order 
to control for differences in living costs (Axelsson and Westerlund 1998). 72.69 per cent 
of those included in our panel sample are ‘locals’ (stayers), that is, people born in the 
country of present residence who live in the same region since birth (no migration). 21.63 
per cent are intranational migrants – people born in the country of present residence who 
had lived in a different region of the country before moving to their present place of 
residence. Finally, 5.68 per cent is made of international migrants, that is individuals who 
were  born  or  had  lived  abroad.  This  latter  category  is,  in  turn,  divided  into  three 
subgroups: (a) those were born in the country of residence, but had lived abroad before 
                                                 
2 The surveys were conducted regularly during the period 1994-2001 at approximately one-year intervals. 
In these surveys approximately 100,000 individuals were interviewed about their socioeconomic status and 
information is collected about their income changes, job changes, education status, living places, age, etc. 
For a review of the ECHP, see Peracchi (2002). 
 
3 Appendix 1 displays the pooled regional distribution of the observations. 
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moving to their current region (1.90 per cent); (b) those born abroad before coming to the 
country of present residence (3.35 per cent); and (c) those born abroad and who lived in 
another foreign country before coming to the country of residence (0.43 per cent). 86.48 
per cent of the sample is made of normally working individuals (15+ hours/week), while 
5.24 per cent and 8.14 per cent is made of unemployed and inactive, respectively. The 
rest of our sample (0.14 per cent) is non-respondents. Finally, 208,485 individuals (64.94 
per  cent  of  our  sample:  64.88  per  cent  for  locals,  65.80  per  cent  for  intranational 
immigrants and 62.45 per cent for international immigrants) share a house with at least 
one other member. The distribution of our sample across migration status is shown in 
Figure 1. 
Insert Figure 1 around here 
The  education  variables  at  individual,  regional,  and  interregional  level  are  calculated 
using the microeconomic ECHP variable ‘highest level of general or higher education 
completed’.  Individuals  are  classified  into  one  of  the  following  three  educational 
categories: recognised third level education completed, second stage of secondary level 
education completed, and less than second stage of secondary level education completed. 
The  use  of  this  educational  proxy  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  any  increment  in 
education level completed, undertaken either by a primary or by a secondary student, 
adds  a  constant  quantity  to  human  capital  stock,  but  that  the  acquisition  of  further 
knowledge at postgraduate level does not, as both  graduate and postgraduate degrees 
belong to the same category (‘recognised third level education’) (Psacharopoulos and 
Arriagada 1986, Ram 1990). The three levels of formal education included in the proxy 
are  defined  by  the  International  Standard  Classification  of  Education  and,  thus,  are 
mutually  exclusive  and  allow  for  international  comparisons.  This,  however,  does  not 
imply  that  their  use  is  problem  free,  as  important  cross-country  differences  in  the 
requirements  and  quality  for  the  completion  of  any  particular  educational  category 
remain in Europe (Centre for Educational Research and Innovation and Organisation for 
Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  1998,  Rodríguez-Pose  and  Tselios  2007). 
Furthermore,  the  education  systems  and  structures  of  each  country  vary  in  terms  of   16
resources,  duration,  and  the  preparation  of  students  (Sianesi  and  Van  Reenen  2003, 
Rodríguez-Pose and Vilalta-Bufi 2005, Rodríguez-Pose and Tselios 2007).
4 
In order to get rid of the problems linked to cross-country comparability, we normalise all 
the educational variables by the national average. In addition, as we are fundamentally 
interested in the size, sign, and significance of the coefficients of the association between 
educational  attainment  at  individual,  household, regional,  and  interregional  level,  and 
earnings, the normalised estimated coefficients are directly comparable. At the risk of 
some oversimplification, the educational attainment of individual i is given the value of 
1 for less than second stage of secondary education, 2 for second stage of secondary level 
education, and 3 for recognised third level education. The educational endowment of the 
neighbouring regions of  s is calculated by means of a weights matrix of the normalised 
regional education endowment ( - k nearest neighbouring regions, with  = k 5, 7 and 9). 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the normalised wage and of the educational attainment 
across migration status. This figure displays the following: in our sample (a) migrants 
have higher wages and a higher average educational attainment than locals, while, among 
migrants, the wages and educational status of intranational migrants are superior to those 
of international migrants; (b) the wage and educational attainment of the other members 
of the household where an immigrant lives are on average higher than those of members 
of local households; (c) the per capita wage and educational endowment of regions with a 
high  concentration  of  migrants  are  higher  than  those  of  regions  without  such 
concentration; and (d) the per capita wage of neighbouring regions is higher in regions 
without  a  high  concentration  of  migrants  or  with  above  average  gatherings  of 
intranational migrants than for those with a high density of international immigrants, 
while the educational endowment of neighbouring regions is roughly similar for migrants 
and non migrants. Overall, the results stemming from the ECHP confirm the fact that, by 
and large, immigrants have a higher level of education than ‘locals’ and that this may be 
an important factor in determining their earnings. 
                                                 
4 A drawback of this measurement of educational attainment is that we are not able to distinguish between 
years of schooling and degrees obtained in order to estimate ‘sheepskin effects’ (Ferrer and Riddell 2008). 
The ECHP data survey does not provide data for years of schooling and includes only three educational 
categories, making it also impossible to test if there is a flatter education-wage profile at higher levels of 
education (Borjas 2005).   17
Insert Figure 2 around here 
Labour  market  experience  and  gender  are  used  as  control  variables.  Labour  market 
experience does not represent actual experience (typically recorded as the weighted sum 
of the number of years of part-time and full-time work since leaving full time education), 
but it is proxied by potential experience calculated as the age minus the education leaving 
age (Harmon et al. 2003). The results of the descriptive statistics show that the average 
work experience of locals included in the sample is 19.15 years, 22.48 for intranational 
migrants, and 21.60 for international migrants. The migrants included in the sample have 
a greater work experience than locals and this may influence their greater earning power 
unveiled by Figure 2. Men tend to dominate the sample. They consitute 57.32 per cent of 
all locals, 53.96 per cent of international immigrants, and 56.07 per cent of international 
immigrants. We use women as the base category for our specifications. The descriptive 
statistics of our main variables are presented in Appendix 2. 
Of  the  controls  used  exclusively  for  migrants,  the  number  of  years  in  the  region  is 
extracted from the ECHP data survey, while the level of economic development of the 
country  of  origin  –  proxied  by  its  GDP  per  capita  –  from  the  World  Bank  World 
Development Indicators dataset. 
 
4. Regression Results 
Running the model with interaction terms for our three categories of individuals – locals, 
intranational migrants, and internaltional migrants – allows us to identify whether across 
the regions of the EU for the period of analysis there are differences in the economic 
returns to education between different types of migrants and locals and whether any such 
differences are the result of household or geographical externalities or of any other type 
of factors. 
4.1. Testing the Mincerian specification with educational and wage externalities 
Table 1 presents the results of the main model, where the economic returns of education 
for  our  three  different  categories  are  tested  (Regression  1).  We  then  control  for   18
educational  and  wage  externalities  at  the  level of  the  household,  the  region,  and  the 
geographical context where the region is located, as well as for work experience and for 
gender,  which  tend  to  be  two  of  the  most  important  determinants  of  earnings 
(Regressions 2-5). In successive regressions we introduce the number of years living the 
region (Regression 6) and the level of development in the country of origin (only for 
international migrants) (Regression 7) as a means of controlling for two additional factors 
that, as stated earlier, will in all likelihood influence the earnings of migrants. 
Insert Table 1 around here 
The results indicate that even though on the surface the pecuniary returns to education for 
migrants are marginally higher than those of locals (Regression 1). these higher returns 
for migrants virtually disappear when effects when the externalities and other controls are 
included in the regressions (Table 1, Regressions 2 through 7). Indeed, when household 
and geographical educational and wage externalities are included, there is a marginal 
difference in the economic returns to education for locals and international migrants (in 
favour of the latter), while the returns for intranational migrants tend to hover around ten 
percentage  points  above  those  of  locals  (Table  1).  These  results  are  robust  to  the 
inclusion of household (Regression 2), regional (Regression 3), interregional (Regression 
4) education and wage externalities, respectively, and of all types of externalities together 
(Regression  5).  This  means  that,  contrary  to  expectations,  there  is  little  sign  of 
discrimination against migrants in the European labour market. Indeed, if there is any 
form of discrimination this is against intranational rather than international migrants.  
The  different  types  of  externalities  included  in  the  analysis  matter  for  wages.  Both 
household and place-based effects generally work in a similar direction for migrants and 
locals. Wage household externalities are negatively associated with wages in all three 
categories  of  individuals  (Regression  2).  This  signals  a  fundamentally  gender-based 
division of tasks within the household.
5 Members of the household with lower earnings – 
generally women – are more likely to sacrifice their career prospects and aspirations in 
order to fulfil other tasks, i.e. raising a family and being the main carers for children 
                                                 
5 This argument has been successfully tested using the interaction term of household wage externalities 
with a male dummy.   19
and/or other members of the family. Although this phenomenon is observed across our 
three categories of individuals, the dimension of the coefficient is marginally larger for 
locals and intranational immigrants than for international ones. This highlights that, for 
the European case, the negative effect of household wage externalities tends to be similar 
across categories or even somewhat lower for international migrants, making the issue of 
lower  economic returns for ‘tied’ movers, in general, and for women who follow their 
husbands  when  they  migrate,  in  particular,  much  less  relevant  than  expected  by  the 
theory. Female international immigrants seem to be, in terms of their personal wages, less 
discriminated  by  household  externalities  than  intranational  migrants  and  locals 
(Regression  2).  This  is  likely  to  show  that  migrants  are  either  more  concerned  with 
maximising household income or even more flexible in the distribution of household 
chores,  allowing  international  women  migrants  to  reap  greater  returns  in  the  labour 
market  than  local  women  or  intranational  women  migrants.  Once  household  wage 
externalities are controlled for, household educational externalities are positive, with the 
coefficient for intranational migrants the highest in all categories analysed. The results 
highlight that, at least in the local and international migrant category, women tend to 
sacrifice their career prospects in order to raise a family or fulfil other tasks in a very 
similar way, regardless of their initial level of education. The use of an interaction term 
of household education externalities with male dummy confirms this argument. 
Geographical  (regional  and  interregional)  externalities  also  matter  for  wages 
(Regressions 3-5). Across the board wage externalities are more relevant than educational 
externalities. Individuals living in regions with high average earnings and surrounded by 
regions with similar wage patterns tend to have higher earnings than individuals with 
similar educational characteristics living in regions and supra-regional areas with lower 
average earnings (Regressions 3-5). Regional and interregional wage externalities vary, 
however,  across  our  individual  categories.  International  immigrants’  wages  tend  to 
benefit  more  from regional wage  externalities (Regression 3),  but  when  interregional 
externalities are included (Regression 5) the coefficient for intranational immigrants is 
highest. In the case for interregional wage externalities, the coefficient for international 
immigrants is the highest (Regression 4), but once again this is not robust (Regression 5). 
When  considering  educational  externalities,  regional  educational  externalities  are   20
negative (Regression 3), but when other externalities are included in the specification, 
this  effect  disappears  (Regression  5).  Interregional  educational  externalities  are,  in 
contrast,  marginally  positive  for  both  categories  of  migrants,  but  not  for  locals 
(Regression 5). 
The introduction of the number of years living in the region (Regression 6) is statistically 
irrelevant  for  international  immigrants  and  positive  and  significant  for  intranational 
migrants. This suggest a relatively swift integration in the labour market for international 
migrants. Hence, the settling in effect identified by Borjas et al. (1992) does not seem to 
apply for international migrants in the case of Europe. The number of years living in the 
region by intranational migrants is, in contrast, rewarded in economic terms. ,As pointed 
out by Faggian and McCann (2006) and Faggian et al. (2007a) for the case of the United 
Kingdom, these migrants are likely to have moved into the region in order to get further 
education, making the number of years in the region function in a similar way to work 
experience (Regression 6). The level of development of the country of origin does not 
affect wages of international migrants, once other factors are controlled for (Regression 
7). 
Finally  the  gender  and  work  experience  controls  introduced  in  the  model  have  the 
expected coefficients. All other things being equal, men tend to earn significantly more 
than women, confirming the well documented gender discrimination in the labour market 
and,  in  relatively  rigid  markets  like  those  across  Europe,  work  experience  makes  a 
difference for wages. The relationship between experience and wages is, however, non 
linear (Regressions 1-7). 
4.2 Sensitivity of the results 
In order to evaluate the robustness of the results of Table 1, we experiment with a number 
of  alternative  individual-specific,  household-specific  and  (inter)region-specific 
specifications of the model.
6 The results of these analyses are presented in Tables 2, 3, 
and 4 and underscore the robustness of the results. 
                                                 
6 The definition, descriptive statistics, and sources of the control variables are presented in Appendix 3.   21
Table 2 controls for a vector of individual characteristics, including overeducation, the 
sector of employment of the individual, the type of job performed, and the health of the 
individual. The results presented in Table 1 are robust to the introduction of additional 
individual controls. The controls also have the expected signs. Overeducation makes a 
difference for earnings (Regression 1), industrial workers earn higher wages than service 
workers  and  these  than  agricultural  workers,  and  individuals  employed  in  the  public 
sector  earn  more  than  those  in  private  employment  (Regression  2).  In  addition, 
legislators, senior officials and managers, professional, and technicians tend to have the 
highest earnings, while agricultural and fishery workers the lowest (Regression 3). As 
expected, individuals with poor health have the lowest earnings (Regression 4). 
Insert Table 2 around here 
In  the  regressions  reported  in  Table  3,  we  introduce  a  vector  of  other  household 
characteristics. Once again the results of the main analysis are extremely robust, with 
coefficients with signs and dimensions that hardly change from those reported in Table 1. 
The results presented in Table 3 indicate some interesting dimensions. First, the earnings 
of individuals decrease with household size, while the impact of the number of adults 
living in the household is unclear (Regressions 1 and 3). The results also show that the 
earnings of different types of households vary (Regressions 1 and 2). Couples without 
children  have  the highest earnings,  although  they  are  not  significantly  different  from 
those of couples with one child. The lowest earnings are found among couples with three 
or more young children and, above all, among the elderly.  
Insert Table 3 around here 
Finally, the introduction of regional controls once again reinforces the robustness of the 
results  (Table  4).  The  coefficients  for  the  returns  to  education  and  for  household, 
regional,  and  supra-regional  externalities  are  similar  to  those  reported  in  Table  1. 
Regarding the additional geographical controls, the results of Table 4 suggest that the 
sectoral  specialisation  of  the  region  tends  to  matter  for  earnings  (Regression  1). 
Innovation  matters  for  earnings  only  if  it  is  measured  by  total  intramural  R&D 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP (Regression 3), but not if it is measured by patent   22
applications  (Regression  2),  Finally,  public  infrastructure  has  a  positive  impact  on 
individual earnings and population density a negative one (Regressions 2 and 3).
7 
Insert Table 4 around here 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper set out to analyse whether the individual economic returns to education varied 
between migrants and non-migrants and whether any observed differences in earnings 
between  migrants  and  locals  were  affected  by  household  and/or  the  less  commonly 
examined geographical externalities. According to the literature, it was predicted that not 
only  would  education  determine  wages,  but  that  any  differences  in  wages  would  be 
affected  by  externalities.  It  was  also  expected  that  both  household  and  geographical 
externalities would be more detrimental for migrants than for locals, because of their 
greater chance of being ‘tied’ migrants – negative household externalities – or their lower 
knowledge of the local environment and labour markets – negative regional and supra-
regional externalities. International migrants were also expected to be disadvantaged vis-
à-vis intranational migrants because of legal barriers in the recognition of titles, lower 
knowledge of the language, and general discrimination with respect to locals in the labour 
market. 
The results of the analysis for a large number of individuals across regions of the EU for 
the period between 1994 and 2001 have confirmed some of these expectations, but not 
others. First, education matters for earnings. Gaining additional formal education pays off 
in the labour market. And this happens across the board. Once other factors are controlled 
for there is little difference in the returns to education for locals and for different types of 
migrants. 
Second, household  and  geographical  externalities  make  a  difference  for  earnings, but 
their influence, with very few exceptions, tends to be similar across different categories 
of individuals. Geographical wage externalities have a positive impact on earnings for 
migrants  and  non-migrants,  whereas  educational  externalities  tend  to  be  largely 
                                                 
7 The results presented in this analysis are robust to the use of alternative methods, such as random effects. 
These results can be provided upon request.   23
irrelevant,  both  at  household  and  geographical  level,  once  wage  externalities  are 
controlled for. 
Third, contrary to expectations from the literature, there is little evidence in the case of 
Europe that settling in periods represent a dent for the earnings of migrants. They do not 
seem to make a difference for international immigrants and are of marginal importance 
for intranational migrants. 
Fourth,  gender  and  experience  matter  for  earnings  and  have  a  similar  impact  across 
categories. Gender is one of the most important factors behind differences in earnings, 
revealing a widespread gender bias in the labour market for locals and immigrants alike. 
Finally, the results are robust to the introduction of additional individual, household, and 
geographical controls. 
Overall, the most important finding is that, contrary to expectations, there seems to be – 
at  least  during  the  period  of  analysis  –  virtually  no  discrimination  against  migrant 
workers in the European labour market and that this fact is robust to the introduction of 
household  and  geographical  externalities.  Locals  and  migrants  with  similar  levels  of 
education tend to command similar wages. Gender discrimination, in contrast, is a more 
pervasive and relevant feature of the European labour market. 
 
Acknowledgments: The authors are grateful to participants at a conference in Milan and, 
in  particular,  to  Marlon  Boarnet  and  Giordano  Mion,  for  their  comments  to  earlier 
versions  of  this  paper.  They  would  also  like  to  acknowledge  the  generous  financial 
support of a Leverhulme Trust Major Research Fellowship and of the PROCIUDAD-CM 
programme, The paper is also part of the research programme of the independent UK 
Spatial  Economics  Research  Centre  funded  by  the  Economic  and  Social  Research 
Council  (ESRC),  Department  for  Business,  Enterprise  and  Regulatory  Reform, 
Communities and Local Government, and the Welsh Assembly Government. The support 
of these funders is acknowledged. The views expressed are those of the authors and do 
not necessarily represent the views of the funders.   24
Bibliography 
ACEMOGLU,  D.,  ANGRIST,  J.  (2001)  How  large  are  human-capital  externalities? 
Evidence from compulsory schooling laws. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, 
15: 9-59 
AXELSSON, R., WESTERLUND, O. (1998) A panel study of migration, self-selection 
and household real income. Journal of Population Economics, 11: 113-126 
BASU,  K.,  NARAYAN,  A.,  RAVALLION,  M.  (2001)  Is  literacy  shared  within 
households? Theory and evidence for Bangladesh. Labour Economics, 8: 649-665 
BECKER, G. S. (1962) Investment in human capital - a theoretical analysis. Journal of 
Political Economy, 70: 9-49 
BÖHEIM, R., TAYLOR, M. P. (2007) From the dark end of the street to the bright side 
of the road? the wage returns to migration in Britain. Labour Economics, 14: 99-
117 
BORJAS,  G.  J.  (1987)  Self-selection  and  the  earnings  of  immigrants.  American 
Economic Review, 77: 531-553 
BORJAS, G. J. (2005) Labor economics).New York, McGraw-Hill 
BORJAS,  G.  J.,  BRONARS,  S.  G.,  TREJO,  S.  J.  (1992)  Self-selection  and  internal 
migration in the United States. Journal of Urban Economics, 32: 159-185 
BRÄUNINGER,  M.,  NIEBUHR,  A.  (2005)  Convergence,  Spatial  Interaction  and 
Agglomeration  Effects  in  the  EU.  HWWA  Discussion  Paper  322,  Hamburg 
Institute of International Economics,  
CARD,  D.  (2007)  How  immigration  affects  U.S.  cities.  Discussion  paper  No  11/07, 
Centre  for  Research  and  Analysis  of  Migration,  Department  of  Economics, 
University College London,  
CENTRE  FOR  EDUCATIONAL  RESEARCH  AND  INNOVATION, 
ORGANISATION  FOR  ECONOMIC  CO-OPERATION  AND 
DEVELOPMENT  (1998)  Human  capital  investment:  an  international 
comparison).Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
CHISWICK, B. R. (1978) The effect of Americanization on earnings of foreign-born 
Men. Journal of Political Economy, 86: 897-921 
CICCONE,  A.,  PERI,  G.  (2006)  Identifying  human-capital  externalities:  Theory  with 
applications. Review of Economic Studies, 73: 381-412 
COOKE, T. J. (2003) Family migration and the relative earnings of husbands and wives. 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 93: 338-349 
COOPER, J. M. R. (1994) Migration and market wage risk. Journal of Regional Science, 
34: 563-582 
DÉTANG-DESSENDRE,  C.,  MOLHO,  I.  (2000)  Residence  spells  and  migration:  a 
comparison for men and women. Urban Studies, 37: 247-260 
DI ADDARIO, S., PATACCHINI, E. (2008) Wages and the city. Evidence from Italy. 
Labour Economics, 15: 1040-1061 
DOSTIE,  B.,  LEGER,  P.  T.  (2009)  Self-selection  in  migration  and  returns  to 
unobservables. Journal of Population Economics, 22: 1005-1024 
EASTERLY, W. R. (2001) The elusive quest for growth: economists' adventures and 
misadventures in the tropics).Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press   25
FAGGIAN,  A.,  MCCANN,  P.  (2006)  Human  capital  flows  and  regional  knowledge 
assets: a simultaneous equation approach. Oxford Economic Papers-New Series, 
58: 475-500 
FAGGIAN,  A.,  MCCANN,  P.,  SHEPPARD,  S.  (2007a)  Human  capital,  higher 
migration:  an  analysis  students  education  and  graduate  of  Scottish  and  Welsh 
students. Urban Studies, 44: 2511-2528 
FAGGIAN, A., MCCANN, P., SHEPPARD, S. (2007b) Some evidence that women are 
more mobile than men: gender differences in U.K. graduate migration behavior. 
Journal of Regional Science, 47: 517-539 
FERRER, A., RIDDELL, W. C. (2008) Education, credentials, and immigrant earnings. 
Canadian Journal of Economics-Revue Canadienne D Economique, 41: 186-216 
GREENWOOD, M. J. (1975) Research on internal migration in United States - survey. 
Journal of Economic Literature, 13: 397-433 
HAAPANEN, M., RITSILA, J. (2007) Can migration decisions be affected by income 
policy interventions? Evidence from Finland. Regional Studies, 41: 339-348 
HARMON,  C.,  OOSTERBEEK,  H.,  WALKER,  I.  (2003)  The  returns  to  education: 
microeconomics. Journal of Economic Surveys, 17: 115-155 
KRIEG,  R.  G.,  BOHARA,  A.  K.  (1999)  A  simultaneous  probit  model  of  earnings, 
migration, job change with wage heterogeneity. Annals of Regional Science, 33: 
453-467 
LANZONA,  L.  A.  (1998)  Migration,  self-selection  and  earnings  in  Philippine  rural 
communities. Journal of Development Economics, 56: 27-50 
LINDELOW,  M.  (2008)  Health  as  a  family  matter:  Do  intra-household  education 
externalities  matter  for  maternal  and  child  health?  Journal  of  Development 
Studies, 44: 562-585 
LÓPEZ-BAZO, E., VAYÁ, E., ARTÍS, M. (2004) Regional externalities and growth: 
Evidence from European regions. Journal of Regional Science, 44: 43-73 
MINCER, J. (1974) Schooling, Experience and Earnings (Human behavior and social 
institutions; 2).New York, National Bureau of Economic Research 
MINCER, J. (1978) Family migration decisions. Journal of Political Economy, 86: 749-
773 
NAKOSTEEN, R. A., WESTERLUND, O., ZIMMER, M. (2008) Migration and self-
selection:  measured  earnings  and  latent  characteristics.  Journal  of  Regional 
Science, 48: 769-788 
NILSSON, K. (2001) Migration, gender and the household structure: changes in earnings 
among young adults in Sweden. Regional Studies, 35: 499-511 
NIVALAINEN,  S.  (2004)  Determinants  of  family  migration:  short  moves  vs.  long 
moves. Journal of Population Economics, 17: 157-175 
NIVALAINEN, S. (2005) Interregional migration and post-move employment in two-
earner families: Evidence from Finland. Regional Studies, 39: 891-907 
OTTAVIANO,  G.  I.  P.,  PERI,  G.  (2006)  The  economic  value  of  cultural  diversity: 
evidence from U.S. cities. Journal of Economic Geography, 6: 9-44 
OTTAVIANO, G. I. P., PERI, G. (2008) Immigration and national wages: clarifying the 
theory and the empirics.  Working paper 14188, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Cambridge,    26
PEKKALA,  S.  (2002)  Migration  and  individual  earnings  in  Finland:  a  regional 
perspective. Regional Studies, 36: 13-24 
PERACCHI, F. (2002) The European Community Household Panel: a review. Empirical 
Economics, 27: 63-90 
PSACHAROPOULOS, G., ARRIAGADA, A.-M. (1986) The educational attainment of 
the  labor  force:  an  international  comparison.  World  Bank  Discussion  Paper, 
Washington, D.C.,  
RAM, R. (1990) Educational expansion and schooling inequality - international evidence 
and some implications. Review of Economics and Statistics, 72: 266-273 
RAUCH,  J.  E.  (1993)  Productivity  gains  from  geographic  concentration  of  human 
capital: Evidence from the cities. Journal of Urban Economics, 34: 380-400 
RITSILÄ, J., OVASKAINEN, M. (2001) Migration and regional centralization of human 
capital. Applied Economics, 33: 317-325 
RODRÍGUEZ-POSE, A., TSELIOS, V. (2007) Analysis of Educational Distribution in 
Europe: Educational Attainment and Inequality Within Regions. Working Paper 
8,  Dynamic  Regions  in  a  Knowledge-Driven  Global  Economy:  Lessons  and 
Policy Implications for the EU,  
RODRÍGUEZ-POSE, A., TSELIOS, V. (2009) Education and income inequality in the 
regions of the European Union. Journal of Regional Science, 49: 411-437 
RODRÍGUEZ-POSE,  A.,  VILALTA-BUFI,  M.  (2005)  Education,  migration,  and  job 
satisfaction:  the  regional  returns  of  human  capital  in  the  E.U.  Journal  of 
Economic Geography, 5: 545-566 
RUDD,  J.  (2000)  Empirical  evidence  on  human  capital  spillovers.  Finance  and 
Economics Discussion Paper 2000-46, Federal Reserve Bank,  
SCHULTZ, T. W. (1961) Investment in human capital. American Economic Review, 51: 
1-17 
SIANESI,  B.,  VAN  REENEN,  J.  (2003)  The  returns  to  education:  macroeconomics. 
Journal of Economic Surveys, 17: 157-200 
SJAASTAD,  L.  A.  (1962)  The  costs  and  returns  of  human  migration.  Joournal  of 
Political Economy, 70: 80-93 
SPENCE, A. M. (1973) Job market signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87: 355-
374 
TSELIOS, V. (2008) Income and educational inequalities in the regions of the European 
Union:  geographical  spillovers  under  welfare  state  restrictions.  Papers  in 
Regional Science, 87: 403-430 
VANDECASTEELE, L., DEBELS, A. (2007) Attrition in panel data: the effectiveness of 
weighting. European Sociological Review, 23: 81-97 
WATSON,  D.  (2003)  Sample  attrition  between  waves  1  and  5  in  the  European 
Community Household Panel. European Sociological Review, 19: 361-378 
WOLF,  A.  (2002)  Does  education  matter?:  Myths  about  education  and  economic 
growth).London, Penguin 
ZHAO, Y. H. (1999) Labor migration and earnings differences: the case of rural China. 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 47: 767-782 
 
   27




















































































































































































































































































































no migration intranational migration international migration
Standardised wage Standardised educational attainment
 
 
   28 
Table  1:  Fixed  effects  regression  results:  Mincerian  specification  with  educational  and  wage 
externalities 
Dependent variable: log of wage of individuals  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 














































Locals    0.0124 
(0.0033)*** 







  0.0364 
(0.0048)*** 






of the other members 
International 
immigrants 
  0.0168 
(0.0089)* 






Locals    -0.4290 
(0.0024)*** 







  -0.4371 
(0.0026)*** 









  -0.4142 
(0.0034)*** 






Locals      -0.0201 
(0.0050)*** 







    -0.0133 
(0.0077)* 






endowment of region 
International 
immigrants 
    -0.0232 
(0.0122)* 






Locals      0.8034 
(0.0192)*** 
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(0.0192)*** 
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(0.0194)*** 


































































          0.0026 
(0.0009)*** 








Log of GDP per capita 
of country of origin 
International 
immigrants 
            -0.0400 
(0.0400) 






















































































































































Observations  321026  208485  321026  321026  208485  203355  7494 
R-squared  0.1989  0.3480  0.2042  0.2021  0.3574  0.3574  0.2401 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2: Fixed effects regression results: Mincerian specification with externalities and individual 
control variables 
Dependent variable: log of wage of individuals  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
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(0.0039)***   31 
















Overeducation  -0.0167 
(0.0035)*** 
     
Industrial sector
a    0.4233 
(0.0115)*** 
   
Service sector    0.3281 
(0.0115)*** 
   
Public sector    0.1138 
(0.0046)*** 
   
Legislators, senior officials and managers
b      0.6922 
(0.0153)*** 
 
Professionals      0.6608 
(0.0148)*** 
 
Technicians and associate professionals      0.5811 
(0.0142)*** 
 
Clerks      0.5261 
(0.0141)*** 
 
Service workers and shop and market sales workers      0.3405 
(0.0139)*** 
 
Craft and related trades workers      0.4659 
(0.0137)*** 
 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers      0.5099 
(0.0142)*** 
 




c        0.1669 
(0.0231)*** 
Health: good        0.1659 
(0.0228)*** 
Health: fair        0.1269 
(0.0229)*** 
Health: bad        0.0524 
(0.0242)** 








Observations  158478  169716  178548  206325 
R-squared  0.3328  0.3544  0.3779  0.3561 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a Base category: Agricultural sector 
b Base category: Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 
c Base category: Health: very bad   32 
 
Table 3: Fixed effects regression results: Mincerian specification with externalities and household 
control variables 
Dependent variable: log of wage of individuals  
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
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Work experience squared 






Male  Locals  0.2749  0.2705  0.2706   33 
(0.0039)***  (0.0042)***  (0.0042)*** 












Household size  -0.0249 
(0.0042)*** 
  -0.0245 
(0.0069)*** 
Number of adults in the household  0.0100 
(0.0045)** 
  0.0015 
(0.0059) 
Couples without children (at least one person aged 65 or 
more)
 












Couple with three children or more (all children aged less 
than 16) 




Couple with one or more children (at least one child aged 16 
or more) 










Observations  208485  179235  179235 
R-squared  0.3576  0.3750  0.3750 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a Base category: Couples without children (both persons aged less than 65) 
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Table 4: Fixed effects regression results: Mincerian specification with externalities and regional 
control variables 
Dependent variable: log of wage of individuals  
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
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(0.0071)***   35 












Gross value added of industry per capita
 a  -0.5617 
(0.3396)* 
   
Gross value added of services per capita  -1.1362 
(0.3314)*** 
   
Patent applications to the EPO by priority year (per million 
of inhabitants) 
  0.0000 
(0.0002) 
 
Total intramural R&D expenditure as a % of GDP      -0.0736 
(0.0242)*** 


















Observations  167976  111974  89180 
R-squared  0.3646  0.3688  0.3768 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a Base category: Gross value added of agriculture per capita 
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Appendix 1: Regional distribution of observations 
a/a  Country  Region  Observations  Percent  a/a  Country  Region  Observations  Percent 
1  Austria  AT1  8,414  2.62  41  Portugal  PT11  7,365  2.29 
2  Austria  AT2  4,970  1.55  42  Portugal  PT12  7,320  2.28 
3  Austria  AT3  7,229  2.25  43  Portugal  PT13  4,551  1.42 
4  Belgium  BE1  2,317  0.72  44  Portugal  PT14  3,672  1.14 
5  Belgium  BE2  9,042  2.82  45  Portugal  PT15  3,819  1.19 
6  Belgium  BE3  8,892  2.77  46  Portugal  PT2  4,905  1.53 
7  Denmark  DK0  24,078  7.5  47  Portugal  PT3  4,655  1.45 
8  Spain  ES1  4,939  1.54  48  United Kingdom  UK11  637  0.2 
9  Spain  ES2  6,334  1.97  49  United Kingdom  UK12  499  0.16 
10  Spain  ES3  4,462  1.39  50  United Kingdom  UK13  688  0.21 
11  Spain  ES4  5,665  1.76  51  United Kingdom  UK21  545  0.17 
12  Spain  ES5  9,209  2.87  52  United Kingdom  UK22  398  0.12 
13  Spain  ES6  7,517  2.34  53  United Kingdom  UK23  759  0.24 
14  Spain  ES7  2,440  0.76  54  United Kingdom  UK24  942  0.29 
15  Finland  FI  25,536  7.95  55  United Kingdom  UK31  1,463  0.46 
16  France  FR1  5,613  1.75  56  United Kingdom  UK32  659  0.21 
17  France  FR2  6,146  1.91  57  United Kingdom  UK33  319  0.1 
18  France  FR3  2,151  0.67  58  United Kingdom  UK40  1,146  0.36 
19  France  FR4  3,329  1.04  59  United Kingdom  UK51  617  0.19 
20  France  FR5  4,482  1.4  60  United Kingdom  UK52  1,598  0.5 
21  France  FR6  3,118  0.97  61  United Kingdom  UK53  1,042  0.32 
22  France  FR7  3,880  1.21  62  United Kingdom  UK54  809  0.25 
23  France  FR8  3,189  0.99  63  United Kingdom  UK55  2,531  0.79 
24  Greece  GR1  7,410  2.31  64  United Kingdom  UK56  895  0.28 
25  Greece  GR2  5,221  1.63  65  United Kingdom  UK57  707  0.22 
26  Greece  GR3  7,786  2.43  66  United Kingdom  UK61  1,389  0.43 
27  Greece  GR4  3,081  0.96  67  United Kingdom  UK62  384  0.12 
28  Ireland  IE  22,607  7.04  68  United Kingdom  UK63  802  0.25 
29  Italy  IT1  3,768  1.17  69  United Kingdom  UK71  616  0.19 
30  Italy  IT2  5,242  1.63  70  United Kingdom  UK72  1,177  0.37 
31  Italy  IT3  5,924  1.85  71  United Kingdom  UK73  827  0.26 
32  Italy  IT4  2,419  0.75  72  United Kingdom  UK81  615  0.19 
33  Italy  IT5  5,052  1.57  73  United Kingdom  UK82  1,116  0.35 
34  Italy  IT6  2,972  0.93  74  United Kingdom  UK83  582  0.18 
35  Italy  IT7  2,429  0.76  75  United Kingdom  UK84  500  0.16 
36  Italy  IT8  3,760  1.17  76  United Kingdom  UK91  642  0.2 
37  Italy  IT9  5,376  1.67  77  United Kingdom  UK92  756  0.24 
38  Italy  ITA  2,840  0.88  78  United Kingdom  UKA1  1,285  0.4 
39  Italy  ITB  2,380  0.74  79  United Kingdom  UKA2  1,054  0.33 
40 
The 
Netherlands  NL  5,241  1.63  80  United Kingdom  UKA4  280  0.09 
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Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics of main variables 
   Obs  Mean or %  Min  Max 
No migration 
Logarithm of individual wage  233347  9.000357  -0.0566245  13.58844 
Educational attainment of individual  233347  -0.0699448  -1.880914  7.789069 
Logarithm of wage of the other members  151404  9.01963  0.2042155  13.58844 
Educational attainment of the other members  151404  -0.0694893  -2.055209  7.772726 
Logarithm of regional wage  233347  9.321016  8.365101  10.1219 
Regional education attainment  233347  -0.0556309  -2.818571  2.770054 
Logarithm of wage of the neighbouring regions  233347  9.342622  8.550203  10.00858 
Educational attainment of the neighbouring 
regions  233347  0.070566  -0.931677  1.177966 
Work experience  233347  19.15434  0  75 
Sex  233347          
Male  133759  57.32       
Female  99588  42.68       
Intranational migration 
Logarithm of individual wage  69431  9.324205  0.4441986  12.72051 
Educational attainment of individual  69431  0.2081711  -1.880914  7.789069 
Logarithm of wage of the other members  45686  9.261203  0.443784  12.61348 
Educational attainment of the other members  45686  0.1797947  -2.055209  7.772726 
Logarithm of regional wage  69431  9.500577  8.365101  10.1219 
Regional education attainment  69431  0.1289316  -2.818571  2.770054 
Logarithm of wage of the neighbouring regions  69431  9.422453  8.550203  10.00858 
Educational attainment of the neighbouring 
regions  69431  0.073205  -0.931677  1.177966 
Work experience  69431  22.48304  0  73 
Sex  69431          
Male  37464  53.96       
Female  31967  46.04       
International migration 
Logarithm of individual wage  18248  9.069917  1.02623  12.92563 
Educational attainment of individual  18248  0.0934078  -1.880914  7.789069 
Logarithm of wage of the other members  11395  9.013014  0.9463045  12.81562 
Educational attainment of the other members  11395  0.0942609  -2.055209  7.772726 
Logarithm of regional wage  18248  9.364764  8.365101  10.1219 
Regional education attainment  18248  0.1796714  -2.818571  2.770054 
Logarithm of wage of the neighbouring regions  18248  9.347154  8.550203  10.00858 
Educational attainment of the neighbouring 
regions  18248  0.0549548  -0.931677  1.177966 
Work experience  18248  21.6039  0  68 
Sex  18248          
Male  10231  56.07       
Female  8017  43.93       
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   Obs. 
Mean 
or %  Obs. 
Mean or 
%  Obs. 
Mean 
or % 
CONTROL: INDIVIDUAL (Source: 
ECHP)                   
Overeducation  172,457     56,492     14,612    
Yes  90,912  0.527  32,974     8,252    
No  81,545  0.473  23,518     6,360    
Main activity of the local unit of the 
business or organisatioin in current job  198,651     55,502     14,968    
Agricultural sector  8,146  0.041  1,163  0.021  444  0.030 
Industrial sector  62,902  0.317  13,655  0.246  4,512  0.301 
Service sector  127,603  0.642  40,684  0.733  10,012  0.669 
Current job in private or public sector  196,529     58,855     14,915    
Private sector, including non-profit private 
organisations  139,838  0.712  34,451  0.585  10,673  0.716 
Public sector, including para-statal  56,691  0.288  24,404  0.415  4,242  0.284 
Occupation in current job  199,907     57,717     15,198    
Legislators, senior officials and managers  10,203  0.051  4,471  0.077  899  0.059 
Professionals  20,314  0.102  12,230  0.212  2,305  0.152 
Technicians and associate professionals  24,551  0.123  10,588  0.183  2,025  0.133 
Clerks  33,480  0.167  7,532  0.130  1,842  0.121 
Service workers and shop and market sales 
workers  27,596  0.138  7,040  0.122  1,958  0.129 
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers  5,580  0.028  750  0.013  325  0.021 
Craft and related trades workers  34,543  0.173  6,347  0.110  2,277  0.150 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers  19,632  0.098  4,158  0.072  1,392  0.092 
Elementary occupations  24,008  0.120  4,601  0.080  2,175  0.143 
How is your health in general?  231,868     68,256     18,084    
Very good  65,288  0.282  21,568  0.316  5,226  0.289 
Good  115,152  0.497  31,907  0.467  8,498  0.470 
Fair  43,015  0.186  12,760  0.187  3,657  0.202 
Bad  7,102  0.031  1,646  0.024  572  0.032 
Very bad  1,311  0.006  375  0.005  131  0.007 
CONTROL: HOUSEHOLD (Source: 
ECHP)                   
Household size  233,347  3.479  69,431  3.196  18,248  3.437 
Number of adults in the household  233,347  2.728  69,431  2.391  18,248  2.591 
Household type (couples)  179,313     55,186     13,893    
Couples without children (at least one 
person aged 65 or more)  2,833  0.016  1,266  0.023  266  0.019 
Couples without children (both persons aged 
less than 65)  34,803  0.194  13,857  0.251  2,805  0.202 
Couples with one child (child aged less than 
16)  25,082  0.140  7,473  0.135  1,918  0.138 
Couples with two children (all children aged 
less than 16)  27,464  0.153  9,552  0.173  2,326  0.167 
Couple with three children or more (all 
children aged less than 16)  8,104  0.045  3,313  0.060  898  0.065 
Couple with one or more children (at least 
one child aged 16 or more)  81,027  0.452  19,725  0.357  5,680  0.409   39
CONTROL: REGIONAL (Source: 
Eurostat)                   
Sectoral composition  181,465     60,229     15,505    
Gross value added of agriculture per capita  8,497  0.047  2,390  0.040  659  0.042 
Gross value added of industry per capita  51,348  0.283  17,278  0.287  4,296  0.277 
Gross value added of services per capita  121,620  0.670  40,561  0.673  10,550  0.680 
Patent applications to the EPO by priority 
year (per million of inhabitants)  216,634  80.374  68,635  137.375  17,658  88.717 
Total intramural R&D expenditure as a % of 
GDP  128,692  1.229  53,045  1.942  10,983  1.503 
Logarithm of motorways (km) per square 
kilometer  189,548  -4.186  63,964  -4.727  15,074  -4.384 
Logarithm of railway lines (km) per square 
kilometer   153,174  -3.190  62,893  -3.291  13,359  -3.105 
Population density  203,013  335.935  60,595  221.955  16,572  411.331 
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